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Abstract. Consensus problems arise in any area of computing where distributed
processes must come to a joint decision. Although solutions to consensus prob-
lems have similar aims, they vary according to the processor faults and network
properties that must be taken into account, and modifying these assumptions will
lead to different algorithms. Reasoning about consensus protocols is subtle, and
correctness proofs are often informal. This paper gives a fully formal develop-
ment and proof of a known consensus algorithm using the stepwise refinement
method Event-B. This allows us to manage the complexity of the proof process
by factoring the proof of correctness into a number of refinement steps, and to
carry out the proof task concurrently with the development. During the develop-
ment the processor faults and network properties on which the development steps
rely are identified. The research outlined here is motivated by the observation that
making different choices at these points may lead to alternative algorithms and
proofs, leading to a refinement tree of algorithms with partially shared proofs.
Keywords: Consensus Algorithms, Stepwise Refinement, Verification, Event-B
1 Introduction
A consensus problem is one in which a number of distributed processes must come to
a common decision despite different initial proposals from the processors. They arise
in many areas of computing, such as the decision to commit to a transaction on a dis-
tributed database or agreeing a common value from a number of independent sensors.
A consensus algorithm is an algorithm which solves the consensus problem for particu-
lar processor and network fault assumptions, timing models and reliability/performance
trade-offs. The wide variety of these assumptions has led to the design of a wide variety
of bespoke consensus algorithms.
Developing consensus algorithms and proving them to be correct is a challenging
task and in many cases informal proofs of correctness are provided. The research in
this paper is motivated by the eventual goal of defining a taxonomy of consensus algo-
rithms, in which algorithms are more or less closely related according to the similarity
or disparity of their underlying assumptions. Such a taxonomy could then form a basis
for a set of stepwise-refined formal developments of consensus algorithms which would
share more or less steps according to the similarity of their fault assumptions.
The purpose of this work is to give a refinement-based approach to the formal de-
velopment and proof of a well-known consensus algorithm as a means of evaluating the
plausibility of a formal taxonomy of consensus protocols. During the development the
processor faults and network properties on which the development steps rely are iden-
tified. Development using stepwise refinement has a number of benefits. Proof com-
plexity is managed by splitting the proof over a number of refinement steps, so proof
invariants may be given and proved at the earliest possible stage, before the introduc-
tion of distracting detail. A stepwise development naturally postpones some decisions
(such as particular fault and network models) and related algorithms may therefore be
developed by making different choices at these points, therefore reusing early parts of
a development.
In this paper a formal development of the Floodset consensus algorithm [12] is
given, using the modelling language Event-B [1]. Floodset is chosen because it is a
relatively straightforward consensus algorithm with strong fault assumptions, and the
Event-B formalism is chosen because it supports stepwise refinement by structuring de-
velopments into a chain of machines linked by refinement relations, thereby managing
the complexity of proof. It is also well supported by proof tools.
Sect. 2 gives the consensus correctness criteria, as well as a description of the Flood-
set algorithm and assumptions. The modelling technology used is outlined in Sect. 3.
The body of the work is in Sect. 4, which describes the development of the Floodset
algorithm by stepwise refinement. Sect. 5 draws some conclusions and considers the
plausibility of this work as a basis for a taxonomy of consensus algorithms.
Related Work Event-B is used in [4] to model the distributed reference counting al-
gorithm, which shares and removes resources in a distributed way while ensuring that
shared resources currently being used elsewhere are not removed. The given algorithm
does not allow for potential faults. In [3] the authors use Event-B to give a stepwise
refinement model of the IEEE 1394 Tree Identify Protocol. This is a specialised con-
sensus problem in which participants must elect a leader. A single abstract event is re-
fined into an existing protocol and message-passing between participants is introduced
in a later refinement. Potential faults within the system are not considered. In [7] an
algorithm for topology discovery is presented in which individual nodes in a network
must remain up-to-date about the changing topology of the network.
In [13] security protocols are developed using Isabelle/HOL. Stepwise refinement
is exploited to break the development into logical stages, and to allow the possibility of
making different choices at various stages in a development. In [8] Event-B is used to
model a consensus protocol under similar assumptions to those made here – messages
may be dropped but not forged. The initial machine is roughly equivalent to our machine
X4. The authors do not address the algorithmic description of protocols. Event-B is
used to consider consensus analysis in [14]. The focus there is on multi-agent systems
and the specification of separate machines which are later composed.
The Heard-Of model [6] is a common representation of a number of standard sys-
tems and failure assumptions, and has been used to verify complex protocols [5].
2 The Floodset Algorithm
A consensus algorithm is one which meets a number of correctness properties and there
are a number of ways in the literature of formulating these. In this work, the following
definitions, taken from [12], are chosen.
Agreement: No two correct processes decide on different values,
Validity: Any decision value for a process is an initial value for some process, and
Termination: All correct processes eventually reach a decision.
The Floodset algorithm [12] is a solution to the consensus problem. It assumes a
synchronous network model (processor computation takes place in synchronous rounds)
and failstop processors (processors may only fail by stopping, and once stopped cannot
restart during that execution of the algorithm.) Processors may not behave maliciously.
Floodset also assumes a reliable network, although messages may not be received if
the receiver has failed. The number of rounds executed is a parameter of Floodset, and
up to t processor failures may be tolerated, provided t+1 rounds are executed, and the
original number of processors is greater than t.
The Floodset algorithm proceeds as follows. Each process1 begins with an initial
value. In the first round, every process sends its identity and value to all other pro-
cesses. Processes retain all received (process, value) pairs. In each subsequent round,
all processes send all the pairs they currently know2. Faulty processors may fail at any
time.
Fig. 1 depicts the first two rounds of an example execution of Floodset on processors
p1, p2 and p3. Fig. 1(a) gives the initial state of the three processes. During the first
round, processor p2 fails after process p2 has sent its name and value to process p3, but
before sending them to process p1. It receives nothing from either of the other processes.
Processes p1 and p3 communicate fully with each other. The state after the first round
is given in Fig. 1(b). During the second round, processes p1 and p3 again communicate
fully, leading to the state shown in Fig. 1(c).
After t+1 rounds have been carried out, each process arrives at its final value by
running a deterministic decision function on its final (local) state, which selects one of
the values known to that process. To demonstrate that each correct process arrives at the
same value, it is sufficient to ensure that the initial inputs each correct process provides
to the deterministic decision function are identical.
To see that Floodset is correct, recall that t+1 rounds are executed, up to t failures
are tolerated, and that failures are failstop (failed processes do not resume execution.)
There must therefore be a round in which no failures occur. After this round (which
we refer to later as the saturation round) all working processes (a superset of correct
processes) must have the information, and this information cannot be added to at later
rounds in the protocol. Each correct process therefore has the same input at decision
1 A process is assumed to run on a single processor, and we therefore conflate process and
processor, referring to both in the subsequent text as pi.
2 A version of Floodset can be implemented which sends only values, and omits process names.
Process names are included to make this model more reusable in the future development of
more complex consensus algorithms.
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Fig. 1. Example initial rounds of Floodset with three processors.
time, and the same value will be reached. Formalising this argument to derive a precise
specification of the state information after each round forms the second part of the
formal development in Sect. 4.2 – 4.5.
3 Event-B
A Event-B [1] model is composed of a sequence of machines, each of which (apart
from the first) is linked to its predecessor by a refinement relation. A machine contains
variablesmodelling state data, invariantswhich restrict the possible values of variables,
and events which change the values of variables. An event consists of guards, which
must be true in order for the event to occur, and actions, in which the values of variables
are changed. Events may be parameterised, and in general an event takes the form
eventname
any p where
G(p, v)
then
S(p, v)
end
where p are the event parameters, v are the state variables of the machine, G is
a list of guards and S is the list of actions, made up of one or more assignments to
variables. Each machine may have associated carrier sets and constants, which are
held in a context visible to the machine. A context may be extended by another context,
visible to subsequent machines in the sequence of refinements.
Proof obligations allow us to establish the internal consistency of individual ma-
chines, and the validity of the refinement relation between machines. Invariant preser-
vation is the proof obligation that requires each invariant to continue to hold whenever
any event occurs.
For any step in the refinement chain, the relationship between the variables in the
abstract model and the variables in the concrete model is given by a gluing invariant.
To show that an event in the concrete model refines an event in the abstract model, it
must be shown that the guards of the concrete event imply the guards of the abstract
event, and that the variable states reached after the occurrence of the concrete and the
abstract event are linked by the gluing invariant.
Proof obligations are generated and in some cases proved automatically by the
Rodin Tools [2]. Those that are not proved automatically may be discharged with the
help of the interactive theorem prover.
4 Development
The approach taken to the development has three stages3. The first stage is the specifi-
cation of the result of a successful run of any consensus algorithm by giving an abstract
description of the chosen consensus properties above. This stage is independent of the
algorithm chosen and corresponds to the initial machine in the development (X0).
The proof of the agreement property relies on the fact that the local views of correct
processes are identical at the end of any execution. To show this, we show that the
views of all working processes become equal before the end of an execution, and do not
change for the remainder of that execution.
The second stage derives a precise specification of the behaviour of each round of
Floodset by formalising the informal proof of correctness given in Sect. 2. The first ma-
chine in this stage (X1) introduces the round structure of the algorithm, and identifies
three phases in the execution. The saturation round is a separate phase, and is the first
round in which no processes fail. All preceding rounds are part of the pre-saturation
phase, and all subsequent rounds are part of the post-saturation phase. The specifica-
tion of the three phases therefore varies according to phase.
Within an execution, a process cannot know which phase it is in, as phase is a
global notion and not a local one. The final specification of the round behaviour must
not therefore vary according to phase. However, identifying the phase facilitates our
development and proof, so phase distinctions are introduced in X1 and used in X2 and
X3. The stronger guards in the saturation round specification in X1 play an important
role in proving the key invariant at the end of Sect. 4.2. In refinement X2 the set live is
identified, which is the faulty processes still working during the saturation round. Re-
finement X3 makes further use of the fault assumptions to define a function between
round numbers and the processes which fail in that round. This brings the phase de-
scriptions to the point where they are equal but for the phase information. Refinement
X4 then merges the three events together, producing a common specification for the
behaviour of each round of Floodset. The final stage is the final refinement (X5) in
which the sending and receiving behaviour of individual processes is introduced and
an abstract network description is given. It is shown by refinement that this description
meets the specification deduced in X4.
The first two consensus properties (agreement and validity) are established in X0
and demonstrated to hold throughout the development using refinement. The third prop-
erty (termination) is shown by model-checking the completed development. Termina-
tion was therefore shown using ProB, a model-checker for Event-B [11].
3 The model is available at http://deploy-eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/.
4.1 The initial machine
The purpose of the initial machine is to define the success conditions for Floodset.
We begin with some terminology. The distributed system considered contains a finite
set of processes, P . Each process p in P has an initial value given by INIT (p) and
drawn from a set V , which is proposed to its peers as a possible final value. The set
CORR ⊆ P is the set of processes which behave correctly throughout the execution
of the algorithm.
After the execution of Floodset each correct process pc has a view – a set containing
all the learned (process, value) pairs. The functionM gives the final view of each correct
process. At termination, each correct process pc runs the decision function on M(pc).
The initial machine contains a single success event floodset (see Fig. 2) which will
fire when the correctness properties hold. On firing, floodset assigns a value toM which
is a correct final outcome of the Floodset algorithm – the properties defining consensus
hold over M .
The guards on the floodset event define the correctness conditions by imposing re-
strictions on the event parameter m, which is then assigned to the final views M . The
first guard gives the type of m, which is the same as the variable M : it assigns views
to correct processes. The second guard establishes the first two consensus properties. f
and g are two arbitrary views from m. The first conjunct of the consequent of guard 2
ensures that these are equal, which is a sufficient condition for the consensus property of
agreement. To ensure validity, the second conjunct (CORR⊳ INIT ⊆f ) requires that
a process is aware of the initial values of all correct processes and the third (f⊆INIT )
conjunct requires that no incorrect values (i.e. ones not in INIT ) are present in any
final view. We assume that the decision function picks one of values given in the final
view.
floodset
any m where
(1) m ∈ CORR→ (P 7→ V )
(2) ∀f, g ·(g ∈ ran(m) ∧ f ∈ ran(m)) ⇒
f = g ∧ CORR ⊳ INIT ⊆ f ∧ f ⊆ INIT
then
M := m
end
Fig. 2. The floodset event in the initial machine.
The third consensus property, that of termination, is a consequence of the firing of
floodset, rather than being a precondition to its firing. We establish this for the final
development using the model checker ProB [11].
4.2 The first refinement: introducing phase specifications
The first refinement begins the second development stage, in which a specification for
the behaviour of a round of Floodset is derived. A different specification is introduced
for each of the three phases. Recall that in an execution of Floodset, the saturation round
is the first round in which no failures occur. In it all currently working processes will
learn all known information. Any rounds before the saturation round are modelled by
the event presat. The saturation round is modelled by the event saturation, and rounds
after the saturation round are modelled by the event postsat. The saturation round may
be any round in an execution. We cannot tell in advance which round will be the satu-
ration round, only that there will be one.
In this refinement a progress counter r is introduced. When r∈1..t+1 it records the
current round number. r = t+2 when the final round is completed, and r = t+3 when
the floodset event has taken place.
The saturation round is labelled j, where j, where j ∈ 1..t+1. In the presat rounds
r<j and in the postsat rounds r>j. Since presat, postsat and saturation are new events
they are considered to refine the skip event. The final event is floodset, a refinement of
floodset in the previous machine. Machines X0 and X1 and the refinement relationship
between them are summarised in Fig. 3.
X0 skip skip skip floodset
⇑ ⇑ ⇑ ⇑
X1 presat saturation postsat floodset
r < j r = j r > j r= t+2
∧
r < t+2
Fig. 3. The refinement relationship between the first two machines.
During execution, each process maintains a working view of the information it has
received. These working views are given by the global variable W ∈ P → (P 7→ V ).
Initially W (p) = {(p, INIT (p))}, since each process begins knowing its own value.
In each round, each process p sends W (p) to all other processes, and at the end of
each round W is updated.
The presat event (Fig. 4) defines the intermediate view W for pre-saturation rounds
(guard 1). The parameter new gives all the information received by each process dur-
ing the round. This could include information already known to the process. The only
restriction on new is given in guard 4 – no process is sent false information. The pa-
rameter w is the updated state of the views of each process when this new information
is received (guard 5). It is assigned to the working view W .
After the saturation event (Fig. 4), every correct process will have the same view. At
this level of abstraction, it is not possible to give a precise specification of this view, but
some restrictions may be identified. The parameter f is a view of an arbitrary process.
Guard 4 requires that it may include only correct information (information from the
presat
any new, w where
(1) r < j
(2) new ∈ P → (P 7→ V )
(3) w ∈ P → (P 7→ V )
(4) ∀p·p ∈ P ⇒ new(p) ⊆INIT
(5) ∀p·w(p) = W (p) ∪ new(p)
then
W := w
r := r + 1
end
saturation
any f, w where
(1) r = j
(2) w ∈ P → (P 7→ V )
(3) f ∈ (P 7→ V )
(4) f ⊆ INIT
(5) CORR⊳ INIT ⊆ f
(6) ∀g ·g ∈ ran(CORR ⊳ w)⇒f =g
then
W := w
r := r + 1
end
Fig. 4. The presat and saturation events in the first refinement.
initial state) and guard 5 requires that it must include the proposed values of all correct
processes. The parameter w has the same purpose as in the presat event – to identify
the updated value of W – but in the saturation round more precise restrictions can be
placed onw. Since no processor fails in this round, all currently working processes send
and receive all their information successfully. After this round all currently working
processors will therefore have the same view. It is not possible at this level of abstraction
to identify the set of currently working processes precisely, but it must contain the set
of correct processes. Thus the only values of W allowed after saturation are those in
which all correct processes share the same view (given by the parameter f ). This view
must be shared by at least all the correct processes (guard 6.)
Since no process can now learn new information, (and therefore W cannot change
further) the postsat event simply increments the round counter until the remaining
rounds have been completed.
The refined floodset event (not given) simply increments the round counter after the
final round.
The invariant below moves the correctness criteria from the floodset event in the
previous machine and shows that the first two consensus properties hold for all rounds
following the saturation round (rounds in which r>j).
r > j ⇒ (∃f ·(f ∈ (P 7→ V ) ∧
CORR⊳ INIT ⊆ f ∧
f ⊆ INIT ∧
(∀g ·g ∈ ran(CORR⊳W )⇒ f = g)))
4.3 Identifying live processes:X2
This refinement introduces no new state, but looks more closely at the existing state
variable W and strengthens the set of invariants relating to it (Fig. 5). The first invariant
gives an upper bound on the information known by a process. It states that all (pro-
cess,value) pairs known by any process must be valid, in the sense that they are given
by the original function INIT . This excludes the possibility of a process learning false
information at any stage. The second invariant states that every process is aware of its
own initial value.
(1) ∀p·p ∈ dom(W )⇒W (p) ⊆ INIT
(2) ∀p·p ∈ dom(W )⇒ p 7→ INIT (p) ∈ W (p)
Fig. 5. Invariants in X2.
The set of processes which fail in an execution is defined as the FLT = P \CORR.
The number of failing processes must not be more than the number of faults (failing
processes) that can be tolerated: t ≥ card(FLT ).
presat
refines presat
any new, w where
(1) r < j
(2) new ∈ P → (P 7→ V )
(3) w ∈ P → (P 7→ V )
(4) ∀p·p ∈ CORR ⇒
CORR⊳ INIT ⊆ new(p)
(5) ∀p·p ∈ CORR⇒ new(p) ⊆ INIT
(6) ∀p·p ∈ FLT ⇒ new(p) ⊆ INIT
(7) ∀p·w(p) = W (p) ∪ new(p)
then
W := w
r := r + 1
end
postsat
refines postsat
any new, w where
(1) r > j
(2) r ≤ t+1
(3) w ∈ P → (P 7→ V )
(4) new ∈ P → (P 7→ V )
(5) ∀p·p ∈ P ⇒ new(p) ⊆ W (p)
(6) ∀p·p ∈ P ⇒
w(p) = W (p) ∪ new(p)
then
W := w
r := r + 1
end
Fig. 6. The presat and postsat events in X2.
The event presat is now refined to the description given in Fig. 6. Since processes
may fail during these rounds and therefore fail to send or receive information the value
of new is non-deterministic. Guard 4 gives a lower bound: each correct process receives
information from all correct processes. Guards 5 and 6 give an upper bound for new for
correct and faulty processes respectively – in each case the process receives only valid
information. The final guard creates the new value for W using the parameter w.
saturation
refines saturation
any w, live where
(1) r = j
(2) w ∈ P → (P 7→ V )
(3) live ⊆ FLT
(4) ∀p·p ∈ CORR ∪ live⇒ w(p) = union(W [(CORR ∪ live)])
(5) ∀p·p ∈ FLT \ live⇒ w(p) = W (p)
(6) ∀p, q ·{p, q} ⊆ CORR⇒ w(p) = w(q)
then
W := w
r := r + 1
end
Fig. 7. The saturation event in X2.
The refined postsat event (Fig. 6) adds the restriction that no process learns anything
new after saturation (guard 6).
The saturation event (Fig. 7) gives the value of W after this round more precisely.
The faulty processes which are currently working at the time of the saturation round
are identified using the parameter live ⊆ FLT (guard 3). After this round, all currently
working processes (CORR∪ live) know all that each currently working process knows
(guard 4.) Processes that have already failed (those in FLT \ live) learn nothing new
(guard 5). We remove the parameter f from saturation to make it more consistent with
the definitions of presat and postsat. The refinement is performed using the witness
f = union(W [CORR ∪ live]). The property that all correct processes have the same
view after saturation is therefore recorded in a different way in guard 6.
4.4 Homogenising the events:X3
The events presat, saturation and postsat are still unimplementable, as they rely on pro-
cesses knowing in advance which round will be the saturation round. Over this refine-
ment (X3) and the next (X4) this reliance on the global saturation variable is removed
by merging these three events into a single event which does not depend on j. The
purpose of this refinement is to finally “set up” this merging by providing versions of
the three events in which each event has the same guards and actions (excluding those
guards which refer to j). The subsequent refinement then merges these three events into
a single event which does not rely on j.
To do this, the set of processes are considered more carefully and those which will
fail in each round are identified. The function d (in context X3 ctx) maps each round
to the set of processes which fail in that round, and is defined by axioms 1–4 in Fig. 8.
Axiom 1 gives the type of d, and axiom 2 ensures that no process can fail in two separate
rounds. All processes in FLT will fail (axiom 3), and no process fails in the saturation
round (axiom 4). The function d may be any function that satisfies these axioms.
(1) d : 1..t+1→ P(FLT )
(2) ∀i, k ·i ∈ dom(d) ∧ k ∈ dom(d) ∧ i 6= k ⇒ d(i) ∩ d(k) = ∅
(3) ∀p·p ∈ FLT ⇒ (∃i·i ∈ dom(d) ∧ p ∈ d(i))
(4) d(j) = ∅
(5) dead : 1..t+2→ P(FLT )
(6) dead(1) = ∅
(7) ∀i·i ∈ dom(dead) ∧ i ≥ 2⇒ dead(i) = union(d[(1 .. (i−1))])
Fig. 8. The axiomatic definition of d and dead in context X3 ctx.
The helper function dead is defined using d in axioms 5–7 in Fig. 8. For each round
dead returns all the processes that have failed prior to the start of that round (axiom 7).
We assume that no processes fail before the start of the execution (axiom 6).
The descriptions of the events presat, saturation, postsat differ only by their second
guard (r < j, r = j, r > j respectively). The definition of presat is given in Fig. 9. The
guards distinguish three disjoint sets of processes, depending on whether they will work
correctly throughout that round, will fail at some point during the round, or have failed
already.
For the first two sets the guards give an upper and lower bound on the new informa-
tion that can be received in a round. All working processes send and receive to them-
selves. Since the processes which fail before round r are given by dead(r), processes
working at the start of a round r are given byCORR∪ (FLT \dead(r)). The processes
working correctly at the end of round r are given by CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r + 1)).
Guard 5 of presat states that the most information a process which works for the
whole round may learn is union(W [CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r))]). In this case all
processes in d(r) transmit all messages before failing. Guard 6 states that the least
information a process working for the whole round will receive is everything known
by any process which survives the round. In this case all processes in d(r) fail before
sending any messages. Processes which have failed before this round and are no longer
communicating will learn nothing in this round (guard 7). Guard 8 states that processes
in d(r) may learn as much as the processes which continue to function correctly for the
whole round. In the worst case, they will fail before receiving any information (guard
9). As previously, the new value for W is identified as w (guard 10). Apart from guard
1, these guards are now identical for each of the three round events.
The invariant on W can now be strengthened, and is given below. It states that
every process still operating after the saturation round learns nothing new after the
saturation round. The common information known at the saturation round is given by
union(W [CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(j))]).
∀p·r ∈ dom(dead) ∧ p ∈ CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r)) ∧ r > j ⇒
W (p) = union(W [CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(j))])
presat
refines presat
any w, new where
(1) r < j
(2) r < t+2
(3) w ∈ P → (P 7→ V )
(4) new ∈ P → (P 7→ V )
(5) ∀p·p ∈ CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r + 1)) ⇒
new(p) ⊆ union(W [CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r))])
(6) ∀p·p ∈ CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r + 1)) ⇒
union(W [(CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r + 1)))]) ⊆ new(p)
(7) ∀p·p ∈ dead(r)⇒ new(p) = ∅
(8) ∀p·p ∈ d(r)⇒ new(p) ⊆ union(W [CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r))])
(9) ∀p·w(p) = W (p) ∪ new(p)
then
W := w
r := r + 1
end
Fig. 9. The event presat in X3.
4.5 Refining out the saturation assumption:X4
In this refinement, the floodset event remains unchanged and the three events presat,
saturation and postsat are merged into the single event round (Fig. 10). To perform the
merging, it must be shown that the concrete guards of round imply the disjunction of
the guards of the merged events. The guards of round are identical to the guards of the
three events in the previous refinement, except that the second guard has been removed,
so the proof reduces to proving the trivial theorem r < j ∨ r = j ∨ r > j.
This round event is now a sufficiently detailed description of a single round of the
algorithm to allow an implementation to be developed and a possible implementation is
shown in the next section.
4.6 Implementing the round event:X5
The round event provides a global specification of the desired behaviour of Floodset at
each round. The purpose of this refinement is to define the local behaviour of individual
processes. A message passing network model is also introduced.
A round is now split into three phases: sending, receiving, and restarting. In the
sending phase messages are sent to the network middleware. In the receiving phase
all the messages for each process are sent to that process. The restarting phase is used
to reset the state of processes after a round. The variable phase records the phase of the
round.
The point at which a process fails is now identified more accurately using the
variables die in send and die in rec. No process sends or receives messages in the
round
refines presat, saturation, postsat
any new, w where
(1) r < t + 2
(2) w ∈ P → (P 7→ V )
(3) new ∈ P → (P 7→ V )
(4) ∀p·p ∈ CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r + 1)) ⇒
new(p) ⊆ union(W [CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r))])
(5) ∀p·p ∈ CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r + 1)) ⇒
union(W [(CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r + 1)))]) ⊆ new(p)
(6) ∀p·p ∈ dead(r)⇒ new(p) = ∅
(7) ∀p·p ∈ d(r)⇒ new(p) ⊆ union(W [CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r))])
(8) ∀p·w(p) = W (p) ∪ new(p)
then
W := w
r := r + 1
end
Fig. 10. The event round in X4.
restarting phase, so a process which fails during restarting may be considered to
have failed during receiving, after all messages have been sent. The important axioms
are
∀i·i ∈ 1 .. t+1⇒ die in send(i) ∩ die in rec(i) = ∅
∀i·i ∈ 1 .. t+1⇒ die in send(i) ∪ die in rec(i) = d(i)
The network middleware is given the variable mw, where mw(p) is the set of all
(process, value) pairs that have been sent to process p. A process p records the pro-
cesses to which it has sent messages as sent(p).
The sending phase consists of multiple occurrences of the send event (Fig. 11),
each parameterised by the sender (fr) and receiver (to). The only processes unable to
send information in round r are the ones which have already failed (given by dead(r)),
so fr may be drawn from any other process (guard 3). Processes do not maintain a
record of their failed peers, so each process sends to all other processes. It would also
be possible to design a “failure aware” algorithm in which a process learns about and
records failed peers, and does not send to processes it knows have failed. The end of the
sending phase is marked by a phase transition event (not given.)
In the rec event (Fig. 11) one of the working processes receives all its amalgamated
information from the middleware in a single message. The processes which are working
at the start of the receiving phase are given by the invariant
receiving ⊆ CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r + 1)) ∪ die in rec(r)
and any of these processes may receive from the middleware (guard 2). Those that will
fail during this round (die in rec(r)) may or may not receive from the middleware
send
any fr, to where
(1) r < t + 2
(2) phase = sending
(3) fr∈CORR ∪(FLT \ dead(r))
(4) to ∈ P
(5) to /∈ sent(fr)
then
mw(to) := mw(to) ∪ W (fr)
sent(fr) := sent(fr) ∪ {to}
end
rec
any p where
(1) r < t+2
(2) p ∈CORR ∪(FLT \dead(r+1))
∪ die in rec(r)
(3) p /∈ received
(4) phase = receiving
then
received := received ∪ {p}
Wpart(p) := Wpart(p) ∪ mw(p)
end
Fig. 11. The events send and rec in X5.
before they fail. Receiving processes are added to the set received, which is local to
the middleware. Wpart is a temporary variable, which contains the partially updated
view of W during the receiving phase.
The end of the receiving phase is marked by the event end rec phase in Fig. 12
which assigns the partial view Wpart to W , and refines the event round from the pre-
vious refinement. It may fire once all working processes have received messages from
the middleware (guard 3).
end rec phase
refines round
when
(1) r < t+2
(2) phase = receiving
(3) (CORR ∪ (FLT \ dead(r + 1))) ⊆ received
then
W := Wpart
r := r + 1
phase := restarting
end
Fig. 12. The end rec phase event in X5.
A number of implementation issues remain open. In particular, events which mark
the end of the sending or receiving phase are global specifications, using global vari-
ables in the guards. The event end rec phase refers to received, which suggests that
processes have knowledge of the internal state of the middleware. In reality this re-
liance would be removed by implementing these events locally as time-triggered events
on each processor. The functions d and dead could be removed from the specification
using a description of an explicit fault injector in the network model.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
We have demonstrated the stepwise refinement in the development of a well-known con-
sensus algorithm, Floodset. The initial, most abstract model captured the three generic
consensus properties in Sect. 2. The first two (agreement and validity) are demonstrated
by construction. They are captured in the initial abstract model, and shown by refine-
ment to continue to hold at each step.
The third property, that all correct processes eventually reach a decision, may be
shown by demonstrating deadlock freeness — that each model in a development (apart
form the first) does not deadlock more often than its predecessor. That is, the only exe-
cution paths permitted are those which eventually satisfy the most abstract specification
in the refinement chain. In this development, the description of rounds in X1 is deliber-
ately more non-deterministic than necessary. The second refinement introduces no new
state, so all properties introduced in X2 could have been introduced in X1. The more
restrictive invariants in X2 mean fewer execution paths, and therefore deadlock free-
dom cannot be proved at this step. However, this refinement is carried out over two steps
to simplify the proofs involved at each stage. Termination was therefore shown using
the ProB [11] model-checker. It was shown that the development has not introduced a
possible deadlock where the floodset event cannot eventually occur. This was shown for
three processes with arbitrary initial state, by checking the truth of the temporal logic
proposition F[floodset] (eventually the floodset event occurs).
A good level of automatic proof (> 75%) is achieved, given the complexity of the
development. However the manual proof overhead is still relatively high, and this may
lead away from the goal of reusable models and proofs.
A number of decision points were identified during the development. Each of these
is a potential point of branching, and so using this development as a basis for a branch-
ing taxonomy seems to be a promising approach. On the other hand, the manual proof
effort required by this work may be too high to be reused in more complex devel-
opments. This work sought to provide a reuseable platform for the development of
consensus algorithms with weaker failure and network models and so the algorithm
transmits sets of (process, value) pairs, rather than just values. Refactoring the devel-
opment to use more simple datatypes may lead to improved levels of automatic proof,
and therefore improve the potential for reuse. A further possibility is to split the final
refinement step to introduce the network model and the individual processes separately.
Floodset relies on the assumption that processes can only fail by stopping entirely.
Allowing Byzantine failures naturally leads to more complex algorithms. An interesting
intermediate case is to allow only authenticated messages between processes. Further-
more, Floodset relies on a synchronous timing model and is a round-based algorithm,
and the development here makes use of that structure. Algorithms developed for asyn-
shronous timing models are less structured, and developing such models using stepwise
refinement is a more challenging task. We will investigate these alternative network and
timing models using the Byzantine Generals algorithm [10] and the Paxos algorithm [9].
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